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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w19972 |
来源ID | Working Paper 19972 |
Rating Agencies | |
Harold L. Cole; Thomas F. Cooley | |
发表日期 | 2014-03-13 |
出版年 | 2014 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | For decades credit rating agencies were viewed as trusted arbiters of creditworthiness and their ratings as important tools for managing risk. The common narrative is that the value of ratings was compromised by the evolution of the industry to a form where issuers pay for ratings. In this paper we show how credit ratings have value in equilibrium and how reputation insures that, in equilibrium, ratings will reflect sound assessments of credit worthiness. There will always be an information distortion because of the fact that purchasers of ratings need not reveal them. We argue that regulatory reliance on ratings and the increasing importance of risk-weighted capital in prudential regulation have more likely contributed to distorted ratings than the matter of who pays for them. In this respect, much of the regulatory obsession with the conflict created by issuers paying for ratings is a distraction. |
主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Markets ; Financial Institutions |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w19972 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/577646 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Harold L. Cole,Thomas F. Cooley. Rating Agencies. 2014. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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