G2TT
来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w19972
来源IDWorking Paper 19972
Rating Agencies
Harold L. Cole; Thomas F. Cooley
发表日期2014-03-13
出版年2014
语种英语
摘要For decades credit rating agencies were viewed as trusted arbiters of creditworthiness and their ratings as important tools for managing risk. The common narrative is that the value of ratings was compromised by the evolution of the industry to a form where issuers pay for ratings. In this paper we show how credit ratings have value in equilibrium and how reputation insures that, in equilibrium, ratings will reflect sound assessments of credit worthiness. There will always be an information distortion because of the fact that purchasers of ratings need not reveal them. We argue that regulatory reliance on ratings and the increasing importance of risk-weighted capital in prudential regulation have more likely contributed to distorted ratings than the matter of who pays for them. In this respect, much of the regulatory obsession with the conflict created by issuers paying for ratings is a distraction.
主题Financial Economics ; Financial Markets ; Financial Institutions
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w19972
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/577646
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GB/T 7714
Harold L. Cole,Thomas F. Cooley. Rating Agencies. 2014.
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