| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w19429 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 19429 |
| Playing Favorites: How Firms Prevent the Revelation of Bad News | |
| Lauren Cohen; Dong Lou; Christopher Malloy | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-09-12 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We explore a subtle but important mechanism through which firms can control information flow to the markets. We find that firms that “cast” their conference calls by disproportionately calling on bullish analysts tend to underperform in the future. Firms that call on more favorable analysts experience more negative future earnings surprises and more future earnings restatements. A long-short portfolio that exploits this differential firm behavior earns abnormal returns of up to 149 basis points per month, or almost 18 percent per year. We find similar evidence in an international sample of earnings call transcripts from the UK, Canada, France, and Japan. Firms with higher discretionary accruals, firms that barely meet/exceed earnings expectations, and firms (and their executives) that are about to issue equity, sell shares, and exercise options, are all significantly more likely to cast their earnings calls. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Portfolio Selection and Asset Pricing ; Financial Markets |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w19429 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/577105 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Lauren Cohen,Dong Lou,Christopher Malloy. Playing Favorites: How Firms Prevent the Revelation of Bad News. 2013. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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