G2TT
来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w19354
来源IDWorking Paper 19354
Rational Housing Bubble
Bo Zhao
发表日期2013-08-22
出版年2013
语种英语
摘要This paper studies an economy inhabited by overlapping generations of homeowners and investors, with the only difference between the two being that homeowners derive utility from housing services whereas investors do not. Tight collateral constraint limits the borrowing capacity of homeowners and drives the equilibrium interest rate level down to the housing price growth rate, which makes housing attractive as a store of value for investors. As long as the rental market friction is high enough, the investors will hold a positive number of vacant houses in equilibrium. A housing bubble arises in an equilibrium in which investors hold houses for resale purposes only and without the expectation of receiving a dividend either in terms of utility or rent. The model can be applied to China, where the housing bubble can be attributed to the rapid decline in the replacement rate of the pension system.
主题Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Macroeconomics ; Macroeconomic Models ; Consumption and Investment ; Regional and Urban Economics
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w19354
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/577029
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Bo Zhao. Rational Housing Bubble. 2013.
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