| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w18740 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 18740 |
| Payment for Environmental Services: Hypotheses and Evidence | |
| Lee J. Alston; Krister Andersson; Steven M. Smith | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-01-25 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The use of Payment for Environmental Services (PES) is not a new type of contract but they have become more in vogue because of the potential for sequestering carbon by paying to prevent deforestation and degradation of forest lands. We provide a framework utilizing transaction costs to hypothesize which services are more likely to be provided effectively. We then interpret the literature on PES programs to see the extent to which transaction costs vary as predicted across the type of service and assess the performance of PES programs. As predicted we find that transaction costs are the least for club goods like water and greatest for pure public goods like carbon reduction. Actual performance is difficult to measure and varies across the examples. More work and experimentation is needed to gain a better outlook on what elements support effective delivery of environmental services. |
| 主题 | Environmental and Resource Economics ; Agriculture ; Environment |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w18740 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/576413 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Lee J. Alston,Krister Andersson,Steven M. Smith. Payment for Environmental Services: Hypotheses and Evidence. 2013. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w18740.pdf（177KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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