| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w18460 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 18460 |
| Trust, Values and False Consensus | |
| Jeffrey Butler; Paola Giuliano; Luigi Guiso | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-10-11 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Trust beliefs are heterogeneous across individuals and, at the same time, persistent across generations. We investigate one mechanism yielding these dual patterns: false consensus. In the context of a trust game experiment, we show that individuals extrapolate from their own type when forming trust beliefs about the same pool of potential partners - i.e., more (less) trustworthy individuals form more optimistic (pessimistic) trust beliefs - and that this tendency continues to color trust beliefs after several rounds of game-play. Moreover, we show that one's own type/trustworthiness can be traced back to the values parents transmit to their children during their upbringing. In a second closely-related experiment, we show the economic impact of mis-calibrated trust beliefs stemming from false consensus. Miscalibrated beliefs lower participants' experimental trust game earnings by about 20 percent on average. |
| 主题 | Other ; General, Teaching ; Microeconomics ; Culture |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w18460 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/576135 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jeffrey Butler,Paola Giuliano,Luigi Guiso. Trust, Values and False Consensus. 2012. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w18460.pdf（277KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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