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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w18045
来源IDWorking Paper 18045
Why do we Redistribute so Much but Tag so Little? The principle of equal sacrifice and optimal taxation
Matthew C. Weinzierl
发表日期2012-05-03
出版年2012
语种英语
摘要The workhorse model of optimal taxation strongly recommends tagging, but its use in policy is limited. I argue that this puzzle is a symptom of a more fundamental problem. Conventional theory neglects the diverse normative criteria with which, as extensive evidence has shown, most people evaluate policy. In particular, if the classic principle of Equal Sacri...ce augments the standard Utilitarian criterion, optimal tagging is limited. Calibrated simulations of optimal policy with normative diversity of this type simultaneously match three features of U.S. policy: substantial income redistribution; rejection of gender, race, and height tags; and acceptance of a blindness tag. Additional implications increase the appeal of this revision to conventional theory.
主题Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Public Economics ; Taxation
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w18045
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/575721
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Matthew C. Weinzierl. Why do we Redistribute so Much but Tag so Little? The principle of equal sacrifice and optimal taxation. 2012.
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