| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w17732 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 17732 |
| Does Transparency Reduce Favoritism and Corruption? Evidence from the Reform of Figure Skating Judging | |
| Eric Zitzewitz | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-01-05 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Transparency is usually thought to reduce favoritism and corruption by facilitating monitoring by outsiders, but there is concern it can have the perverse effect of facilitating collusion by insiders. In response to vote trading scandals in the 1998 and 2002 Olympics, the International Skating Union (ISU) introduced a number of changes to its judging system, including obscuring which judge issued which mark. The stated intent was to disrupt collusion by groups of judges, but this change also frustrates most attempts by outsiders to monitor judge behavior. I find that the "compatriot-judge effect", which aggregates favoritism (nationalistic bias from own-country judges) and corruption (vote trading), actually increased slightly after the reforms. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Economics of Information |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w17732 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/575407 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Eric Zitzewitz. Does Transparency Reduce Favoritism and Corruption? Evidence from the Reform of Figure Skating Judging. 2012. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w17732.pdf（327KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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