G2TT
来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w17518
来源IDWorking Paper 17518
Ending \"Too Big To Fail\": Government Promises vs. Investor Perceptions
Todd A. Gormley; Simon Johnson; Changyong Rhee
发表日期2011-10-20
出版年2011
语种英语
摘要Can a government credibly promise not to bailout firms whose failure would have major negative systemic consequences? Our analysis of Korea's 1997-99 crisis, suggests an answer: No. Despite a general "no bailout" policy during the crisis, the largest Korean corporate groups (chaebol) - facing severe financial and governance problems - could still borrow heavily from households through issuing bonds at prices implying very low expected default risk. The evidence suggests "too big to fail" beliefs were not eliminated by government promises, presumably because investors believed that this policy was not time consistent. Subsequent government handling of potential and actual defaults by Daewoo and Hyundai confirmed the market view that creditors would be protected.
主题Macroeconomics ; Money and Interest Rates ; Financial Economics ; Financial Markets ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w17518
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/575193
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Todd A. Gormley,Simon Johnson,Changyong Rhee. Ending \"Too Big To Fail\": Government Promises vs. Investor Perceptions. 2011.
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