全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Organ Allocation Policy and the Decision to Donate

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w17324
来源ID	Working Paper 17324
	Organ Allocation Policy and the Decision to Donate
	Judd B. Kessler; Alvin E. Roth
发表日期	2011-08-18
出版年	2011
语种	英语
摘要	Organ donations from deceased donors provide the majority of transplanted organs in the United States, and one deceased donor can save numerous lives by providing multiple organs. Nevertheless, most Americans are not registered organ donors despite the relative ease of becoming one. We study in the laboratory an experimental game modeled on the decision to register as an organ donor, and investigate how changes in the management of organ waiting lists might impact donations. We find that an organ allocation policy giving priority on waiting lists to those who previously registered as donors has a significant positive impact on registration.
主题	Econometrics ; Experimental Design ; Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health ; Education
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w17324
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/574998
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Judd B. Kessler,Alvin E. Roth. Organ Allocation Policy and the Decision to Donate. 2011.