| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w17106 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 17106 |
| Institutional Comparative Statics | |
| James A. Robinson; Ragnar Torvik | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-06-02 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Why was the Black Death followed by the decline of serfdom in Western Europe but its' intensification in Eastern Europe? What explains why involvement in Atlantic trade in the Early Modern period was positively correlated with economic growth in Britain but negatively correlated in Spain? Why did frontier expansion in the 19th Century Americas go along with economic growth in the United States and economic decline in Latin America? Why do natural resource booms seem to stimulate growth in some countries, but lead to a 'curse' in others, and why does foreign aid sometimes seem to encourage, other times impede economic growth? In this paper we argue that the response of economies to shocks or innovations in economic opportunities depends on the nature of institutions. When institutions are strong, new opportunities or windfalls can have positive effects. But when institutions are weak they can have negative effects. We present a simple model to illustrate how comparative statics are conditional on the nature of institutions and show how this perspective helps to unify a large number of historical episodes and empirical studies. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; History ; Other History |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w17106 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/574781 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | James A. Robinson,Ragnar Torvik. Institutional Comparative Statics. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w17106.pdf（256KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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