全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): The Hired Gun Mechanism

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w17032
来源ID	Working Paper 17032
	The Hired Gun Mechanism
	James Andreoni; Laura K. Gee
发表日期	2011-05-05
出版年	2011
语种	英语
摘要	We present and experimentally test a mechanism that provides a simple, natural, low cost, and realistic solution to the problem of compliance with socially determined efficient actions, such as contributing to a public good. We note that small self-governing organizations often place enforcement in the hands of an appointed leader-the department chair, the building superintendent, the team captain. This hired gun, we show, need only punish the least compliant group member, and then only punish this person enough so that the person would have rather been the second least compliant. We show experimentally this mechanism, despite having very small penalties out of equilibrium, reaches the full compliance equilibrium almost instantly.
主题	Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Econometrics ; Experimental Design ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Public Economics ; Public Goods
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w17032
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/574705
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	James Andreoni,Laura K. Gee. The Hired Gun Mechanism. 2011.