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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w17032 |
来源ID | Working Paper 17032 |
The Hired Gun Mechanism | |
James Andreoni; Laura K. Gee | |
发表日期 | 2011-05-05 |
出版年 | 2011 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We present and experimentally test a mechanism that provides a simple, natural, low cost, and realistic solution to the problem of compliance with socially determined efficient actions, such as contributing to a public good. We note that small self-governing organizations often place enforcement in the hands of an appointed leader-the department chair, the building superintendent, the team captain. This hired gun, we show, need only punish the least compliant group member, and then only punish this person enough so that the person would have rather been the second least compliant. We show experimentally this mechanism, despite having very small penalties out of equilibrium, reaches the full compliance equilibrium almost instantly. |
主题 | Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Econometrics ; Experimental Design ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Public Economics ; Public Goods |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w17032 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/574705 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | James Andreoni,Laura K. Gee. The Hired Gun Mechanism. 2011. |
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文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
w17032.pdf(112KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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