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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w17032
来源IDWorking Paper 17032
The Hired Gun Mechanism
James Andreoni; Laura K. Gee
发表日期2011-05-05
出版年2011
语种英语
摘要We present and experimentally test a mechanism that provides a simple, natural, low cost, and realistic solution to the problem of compliance with socially determined efficient actions, such as contributing to a public good. We note that small self-governing organizations often place enforcement in the hands of an appointed leader-the department chair, the building superintendent, the team captain. This hired gun, we show, need only punish the least compliant group member, and then only punish this person enough so that the person would have rather been the second least compliant. We show experimentally this mechanism, despite having very small penalties out of equilibrium, reaches the full compliance equilibrium almost instantly.
主题Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Econometrics ; Experimental Design ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Public Economics ; Public Goods
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w17032
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/574705
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GB/T 7714
James Andreoni,Laura K. Gee. The Hired Gun Mechanism. 2011.
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