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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w16519 |
来源ID | Working Paper 16519 |
Efficiency Advantages of Grandfathering in Rights-Based Fisheries Management | |
Terry L. Anderson; Ragnar Arnason; Gary D. Libecap | |
发表日期 | 2010-11-04 |
出版年 | 2010 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We show that grandfathering fishing rights to local users or recognizing first possessions is more dynamically efficient than auctions of such rights. It is often argued that auctions allocate rights to the highest-valued users and thereby maximize resource rents. We counter that rents are not fixed in situ, but rather depend additionally upon the innovation, investment, and collective actions of fishers, who discover and enhance stocks and convert them into valuable goods and services. Our analysis shows how grandfathering increases rents by raising expected rates of return for investment, lowering the cost of capital, and providing incentives for collective action. |
主题 | Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Other ; Law and Economics ; History ; Other History ; Environmental and Resource Economics ; Renewable Resources |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w16519 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/574194 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Terry L. Anderson,Ragnar Arnason,Gary D. Libecap. Efficiency Advantages of Grandfathering in Rights-Based Fisheries Management. 2010. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
w16519.pdf(277KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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