| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w16325 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 16325 |
| Competition and the Ratchet Effect | |
| Gary Charness; Peter Kuhn; Marie-Claire Villeval | |
| 发表日期 | 2010-09-02 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In labor markets, the ratchet effect refers to a situation where workers subject to performance pay choose to restrict their output, because they rationally anticipate that firms will respond to higher output levels by raising output requirements or cutting pay. We model this effect as a multi-period principal-agent problem with hidden information, and study its robustness to labor market competition both theoretically and experimentally. Consistent with our theoretical model, we observe substantial ratchet effects in the absence of competition, which is nearly eliminated when competition is introduced; this is true regardless of whether market conditions favor firms or workers. |
| 主题 | Econometrics ; Experimental Design ; Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Economics of Information ; Labor Economics ; Labor Supply and Demand ; Labor Compensation ; Labor Market Structures ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w16325 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/574000 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Gary Charness,Peter Kuhn,Marie-Claire Villeval. Competition and the Ratchet Effect. 2010. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w16325.pdf（288KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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