| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w16080 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 16080 |
| Adverse Selection, Reputation and Sudden Collapses in Secondary Loan Markets | |
| V.V. Chari; Ali Shourideh; Ariel Zetlin-Jones | |
| 发表日期 | 2010-06-10 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Banks and financial intermediaries that originate loans often sell some of these loans or securitize them in secondary loan markets and hold on to others. New issuances in such secondary markets collapse abruptly on occasion, typically when collateral values used to secure the underlying loans fall. These collapses are viewed by policymakers as signs that the market is not functioning efficiently. In this paper, we develop a dynamic adverse selection model in which small reductions in collateral values can generate abrupt inefficient collapses in new issuances in the secondary loan market. In our model, reductions in collateral values worsen the adverse selection problem and induce some potential sellers to hold on to their loans. Reputational incentives induce a large fraction of potential sellers to hold on to their loans rather than sell them in the secondary market. We find that a variety of policies that have been proposed during the recent crisis to remedy market inefficiencies do not help resolve the adverse selection problem. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Money and Interest Rates ; Monetary Policy ; Financial Economics ; Financial Markets ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w16080 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/573755 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | V.V. Chari,Ali Shourideh,Ariel Zetlin-Jones. Adverse Selection, Reputation and Sudden Collapses in Secondary Loan Markets. 2010. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w16080.pdf（423KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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