| 来源类型 | Working Paper
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| 规范类型 | 报告
|
| DOI | 10.3386/w15977
|
| 来源ID | Working Paper 15977
|
| Personnel Economics: Hiring and Incentives |
| Paul Oyer; Scott Schaefer
|
| 发表日期 | 2010-05-06
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| 出版年 | 2010
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | We survey the Personnel Economics literature, focusing on how firms establish, maintain, and end employment relationships and on how firms provide incentives to employees. This literature has been very successful in generating models and empirical work about incentive systems. Some of the unanswered questions in this area -- for example, the empirical relevance of the risk/incentive tradeoff and the question of whether CEO pay arrangements reflect competitive markets and efficient contracting -- are likely to be very difficult to answer due to measurement problems. The literature has been less successful at explaining how firms can find the right employees in the first place. Economists understand the broad economic forces -- matching with costly search and bilateral asymmetric information -- that firms face in trying to hire. But the main models in this area treat firms as simple black-box production functions. Less work has been done to understand how different firms approach the hiring problem, what determines the firm-level heterogeneity in hiring strategies, and whether these patterns conform to theory. We survey some literature in this area and suggest areas for further research. |
| 主题 | Labor Economics
; Labor Compensation
; Other
; Accounting, Marketing, and Personnel
|
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w15977
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/573652
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Paul Oyer,Scott Schaefer. Personnel Economics: Hiring and Incentives. 2010.
|
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文件名：
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w15977.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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