| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w15967 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 15967 |
| On the Formation of Coalitions to Provide Public Goods - Experimental Evidence from the Lab | |
| Astrid Dannenberg; Andreas Lange; Bodo Sturm | |
| 发表日期 | 2010-05-06 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The provision of public goods often relies on voluntary contributions and cooperation. While most of the experimental literature focuses on individual contributions, many real-world problems involve the formation of institutions among subgroups (coalitions) of players. International agreements serve as one example. This paper experimentally tests theory on the formation of coalitions in different institutions and compares those to a voluntary contribution mechanism. The experiment confirms the rather pessimistic conclusions from the theory: only few players form a coalition when the institution prescribes the full internalization of mutual benefits of members. Contrary to theory, coalitions that try to reduce the free-riding incentives by requiring less provision from their members, do not attract additional members. Substantial efficiency gains occur, however, both along the extensive and intensive margin when coalition members can each suggest a minimum contribution level with the smallest common denominator being binding. The experiment thereby shows that the acceptance of institutions depends on how terms of coalitions are reached. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Econometrics ; Experimental Design ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Public Economics ; Public Goods |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w15967 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/573642 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Astrid Dannenberg,Andreas Lange,Bodo Sturm. On the Formation of Coalitions to Provide Public Goods - Experimental Evidence from the Lab. 2010. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w15967.pdf（167KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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