| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w14506 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 14506 |
| The Strategic Timing Incentives of Commercial Radio Stations: An Empirical Analysis Using Multiple Equilibria | |
| Andrew Sweeting | |
| 发表日期 | 2008-11-20 |
| 出版年 | 2008 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Commercial radio stations and advertisers have potentially conflicting interests about when commercial breaks should be played. This paper estimates an incomplete information timing game to examine stations' equilibrium timing incentives. It shows how identification can be aided by the existence of multiple equilibria when appropriate data are available. It finds that stations want to play their commercials at the same time, suggesting that mechanisms exist which align the incentives of stations with the interests of advertisers. It also shows that coordination incentives are much stronger during drivetime hours, when more listeners switch stations, and in smaller markets. |
| 主题 | Econometrics ; Estimation Methods ; Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance ; Industry Studies |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w14506 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/572181 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Andrew Sweeting. The Strategic Timing Incentives of Commercial Radio Stations: An Empirical Analysis Using Multiple Equilibria. 2008. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w14506.pdf（437KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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