全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Institutions and Contract Enforcement

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w13961
来源ID	Working Paper 13961
	Institutions and Contract Enforcement
	Armin Falk; David Huffman; W. Bentley MacLeod
发表日期	2008-04-18
出版年	2008
语种	英语
摘要	We provide evidence on how two important types of institutions -- dismissal barriers, and bonus pay -- affect contract enforcement behavior in a market with incomplete contracts and repeated interactions. Dismissal barriers are shown to have a strong negative impact on worker performance, and market efficiency, by interfering with firms' use of firing threat as an incentive device. Dismissal barriers also distort the dynamics of worker effort levels over time, cause firms to rely more on the spot market for labor, and create a distribution of relationship lengths in the market that is more extreme, with more very short and more very long relationships. The introduction of a bonus pay option dramatically changes the market outcome. Firms are observed to substitute bonus pay for threat of firing as an incentive device, almost entirely offsetting the negative incentive and efficiency effects of dismissal barriers. Nevertheless, contract enforcement behavior remains fundamentally changed, because the option to pay bonuses causes firms to rely less on long-term relationships. Our results show that market outcomes are the result of a complex interplay between contract enforcement policies and the institutions in which they are embedded.
主题	Econometrics ; Experimental Design ; Microeconomics ; Labor Economics ; Labor Compensation ; Labor Market Structures
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w13961
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/571633
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Armin Falk,David Huffman,W. Bentley MacLeod. Institutions and Contract Enforcement. 2008.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
w13961.pdf（457KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览