| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w13864 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 13864 |
| Monopoly and the Incentive to Innovate When Adoption Involves Switchover Disruptions | |
| Thomas J. Holmes; David K. Levine; James A. Schmitz, Jr. | |
| 发表日期 | 2008-03-12 |
| 出版年 | 2008 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | When considering the incentive of a monopolist to adopt an innovation, the textbook model assumes that it can instantaneously and seamlessly introduce the new technology. In fact, firms often face major problems in integrating new technologies. In some cases, firms have to (temporarily) produce at levels substantially below capacity upon adoption. We call such phenomena switchover disruptions, and present extensive evidence on them. If firms face switchover disruptions, then they may temporarily lose some unit sales upon adoption. If the firm loses unit sales, then a cost of adoption is the foregone rents on the sales of those units. Hence, greater market power will mean higher prices on those lost units of output, and hence a reduced incentive to innovate. We introduce switchover disruptions into some standard models in the literature, show they can overturn some famous results, and then show they can help explain evidence that firms in more competitive environments are more likely to adopt technologies and increase productivity. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w13864 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/571538 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Thomas J. Holmes,David K. Levine,James A. Schmitz, Jr.. Monopoly and the Incentive to Innovate When Adoption Involves Switchover Disruptions. 2008. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w13864.pdf（425KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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