| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w13788 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 13788 |
| On Best-Response Bidding in GSP Auctions | |
| Matthew Cary; Aparna Das; Benjamin Edelman; Ioannis Giotis; Kurtis Heimerl; Anna R. Karlin; Claire Mathieu; Michael Schwarz | |
| 发表日期 | 2008-02-12 |
| 出版年 | 2008 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | How should players bid in keyword auctions such as those used by Google, Yahoo! and MSN? We model ad auctions as a dynamic game of incomplete information, so we can study the convergence and robustness properties of various strategies. In particular, we consider best-response bidding strategies for a repeated auction on a single keyword, where in each round, each player chooses some optimal bid for the next round, assuming that the other players merely repeat their previous bids. We focus on a strategy we call Balanced Bidding (bb). If all players use the bb strategy, we show that bids converge to a bid vector that obtains in a complete information static model proposed by Edelman, Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2007). We prove that convergence occurs with probability 1, and we compute the expected time until convergence. |
| 主题 | Econometrics ; Estimation Methods ; Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Industrial Organization ; Industry Studies ; Other ; Accounting, Marketing, and Personnel |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w13788 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/571464 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Matthew Cary,Aparna Das,Benjamin Edelman,et al. On Best-Response Bidding in GSP Auctions. 2008. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w13788.pdf（276KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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