| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w13268 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 13268 |
| When are Auctions Best? | |
| Jeremy I. Bulow; Paul D. Klemperer | |
| 发表日期 | 2007-07-20 |
| 出版年 | 2007 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We compare the two most common bidding processes for selling a company or other asset when participation is costly to buyers. In an auction all entry decisions are made prior to any bidding. In a sequential bidding process earlier entrants can make bids before later entrants choose whether to compete. The sequential process is more efficient because entrants base their decisions on superior information. But pre-emptive bids transfer surplus from the seller to buyers. Because the auction is more conducive to entry in several ways it usually generates higher expected revenue. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w13268 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/570939 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jeremy I. Bulow,Paul D. Klemperer. When are Auctions Best?. 2007. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w13268.pdf（310KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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