| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w12100 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 12100 |
| A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt | |
| Marco Battaglini; Stephen Coate | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-03-20 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper presents a dynamic political economy theory of public spending, taxation and debt. Policy choices are made by a legislature consisting of representatives elected by geographically-defined districts. The legislature can raise revenues via a distortionary income tax and by borrowing. These revenues can be used to finance a national public good and district-specific transfers (interpreted as pork-barrel spending). The value of the public good is stochastic, reflecting shocks such as wars or natural disasters. In equilibrium, policy-making cycles between two distinct regimes: %u201Cbusiness-as-usual%u201D in which legislators bargain over the allocation of pork, and %u201Cresponsible-policy-making%u201D in which policies maximize the collective good. Transitions between the two regimes are brought about by shocks in the value of the public good. In the long run, equilibrium tax rates are too high and too volatile, public good provision is too low and debt levels are too high. In some environments, a balanced budget requirement can improve citizen welfare. |
| 主题 | Public Economics ; National Fiscal Issues |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w12100 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/569754 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Marco Battaglini,Stephen Coate. A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt. 2006. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w12100.pdf（595KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
