| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w12080 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 12080 |
| Insurance and Incentives for Medical Innovation | |
| Alan M. Garber; Charles I. Jones; Paul M. Romer | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-03-06 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper studies the interactions between health insurance and the incentives for innovation. Although we focus on pharmaceutical innovation, our discussion applies to other industries producing novel technologies for sale in markets with subsidized demand. Standard results in the growth and productivity literatures suggest that firms in many industries may possess inadequate incentives to innovate. Standard results in the health literature suggest that health insurance leads to the overutilization of health care. Our study of innovation in the pharmaceutical industry emphasizes the interaction of these incentives. Because of the large subsidies to demand from health insurance, limits on the lifetime of patents and possibly limits on monopoly pricing may be necessary to ensure that pharmaceutical companies do not possess excess incentives for innovation. |
| 主题 | Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health ; Development and Growth ; Innovation and R& ; D |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w12080 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/569733 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alan M. Garber,Charles I. Jones,Paul M. Romer. Insurance and Incentives for Medical Innovation. 2006. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w12080.pdf（250KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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