| 来源类型 | Working Paper
|
| 规范类型 | 报告
|
| DOI | 10.3386/w12076
|
| 来源ID | Working Paper 12076
|
| Discretionary Policy and Multiple Equilibria |
| Robert G. King
|
| 发表日期 | 2006-03-06
|
| 出版年 | 2006
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | Discretionary policymaking can foster strategic complementarities between private sector decisions, thus leading to multiple equilibria. This article studies a simple example, originating with Kydland and Prescott, of a government which must decide whether to build a dam to prevent adverse effects on floods on the incomes of residents of a floodplain. In this example, it is socially inefficient to build the dam and for people to live on the floodplain, with this outcome being the unique equilibrium under policy commitment. Under discretion, there are two equilibria. First, if agents believe that few of their fellow citizens will move to the floodplain, then they know that the government will choose not to build the dam and there is therefore no incentive for any individual to locate on the floodplain. Second, if agents believe that there will be many floodplain residents, then they know that the government will choose to build the dam and even small benefits of living on the floodplain will lead them to choose that location. In this second equilibrium, all individuals are worse off. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics
; Monetary Policy
; Fiscal Policy
|
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w12076
|
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
|
| 引用统计 |
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/569729
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Robert G. King. Discretionary Policy and Multiple Equilibria. 2006.
|
|
文件名：
|
w12076.pdf
|
|
格式：
|
Adobe PDF
|
此文件暂不支持浏览
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
