全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Crime, Punishment, and Myopia

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w11491
来源ID	Working Paper 11491
	Crime, Punishment, and Myopia
	David S. Lee; Justin McCrary
发表日期	2005-07-18
出版年	2005
语种	英语
摘要	Economic theory predicts that increasing the severity of punishments will deter criminal behavior by raising the expected price of committing crime. This implicit price can be substantially raised by making prison sentences longer, but only if offenders' discount rates are relatively low. We use a large sample of felony arrests to measure the deterrence effect of criminal sanctions. We exploit the fact that young offenders are legally treated as adults--and face longer lengths of incarceration--the day they turn 18. Sufficiently patient individuals should therefore significantly lower their offending rates immediately upon turning 18. The small behavioral responses that we estimate suggest that potential offenders are extremely impatient, myopic, or both.
主题	Microeconomics ; Behavioral Economics ; Other ; Law and Economics
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w11491
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/569134
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	David S. Lee,Justin McCrary. Crime, Punishment, and Myopia. 2005.