| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w11484 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 11484 |
| Political Competition and Economic Performance: Theory and Evidence from the United States | |
| Timothy Besley; Torsten Persson; Daniel Sturm | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-07-11 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | One of the most cherished propositions in economics is that market competition by and large raises consumer welfare. But whether political competition has similarly virtuous consequences is far less discussed. This paper formulates a model to explain why political competition may enhance economic performance and uses the United States as a testing ground for the model's implications. It finds statistically robust evidence that political competition has quantitatively important effects on state income growth, state policies, and the quality of Governors. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Public Economics ; Subnational Fiscal Issues ; History ; Macroeconomic History ; Development and Growth ; Development |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w11484 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/569127 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Timothy Besley,Torsten Persson,Daniel Sturm. Political Competition and Economic Performance: Theory and Evidence from the United States. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w11484.pdf（1077KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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