| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w10125 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 10125 |
| International Lending of Last Resort and Moral Hazard: A Model of IMF's Catalytic Finance | |
| Giancarlo Corsetti; Bernardo Guimaraes; Nouriel Roubini | |
| 发表日期 | 2003-12-08 |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | It is often argued that the provision of liquidity by the international institutions such as the IMF to countries experiencing balance of payment problems can have catalytic effects on the behavior of international financial markets, i.e., it can reduce the scale of liquidity runs by inducing investors to roll over their financial claims to the country. Critics point out that official lending also causes moral hazard distortions: expecting to be bailed out by the IMF, debtor countries have weak incentives to implement good but costly policies, thus raising the probability of a crisis. This paper presents an analytical framework to study the trade-off between official liquidity provision and debtor moral hazard. In our model international financial crises are caused by the interaction of bad fundamentals, self-fulfilling runs and policies by three classes of optimizing agents: international investors, the local government and the IMF. We show how an international financial institution helps prevent liquidity runs via coordination of agents' expectations, by raising the number of investors willing to lend to the country for any given level of the fundamental. We show that the influence of such an institution is increasing in the size of its interventions and the precision of its information: more liquidity support and better information make agents more willing to roll over their debt and reduces the probability of a crisis. Different from the conventional view stressing debtor moral hazard, we show that official lending may actually strengthen a government incentive to implement desirable but costly policies. By worsening the expected return on these policies, destructive liquidity runs may well discourage governments from undertaking them, unless they can count on contingent liquidity assistance. |
| 主题 | International Economics ; International Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w10125 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/567753 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Giancarlo Corsetti,Bernardo Guimaraes,Nouriel Roubini. International Lending of Last Resort and Moral Hazard: A Model of IMF's Catalytic Finance. 2003. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w10125.pdf（401KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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