全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Physician Fee Policy and Medicaid Program Costs

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w6087
来源ID	Working Paper 6087
	Physician Fee Policy and Medicaid Program Costs
	Jonathan Gruber; Kathleen Adams; Joseph P. Newhouse
发表日期	1997-07-01
出版年	1997
语种	英语
摘要	We investigate the hypothesis that increasing access for the indigent to physician offices shifts care from hospital outpatient settings and lowers Medicaid costs (the so-called offset effect'). To evaluate this hypothesis we exploit a large increase in physician fees in the Tennessee Medicaid program, using Georgia as a control. We find that beneficiaries shifted care from clinics to offices, but that there was little or no shifting from hospital outpatient departments or emergency rooms. Thus, we find no offset effect in outpatient expenditures. Inpatient admissions and expenditures fell, reducing overall program spending eight percent. Because the inpatient reduction did not occur in ambulatory-care-sensitive diagnoses, however, we cannot demonstrate a causal relationship with the fee change.
主题	Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w6087
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/563595
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Jonathan Gruber,Kathleen Adams,Joseph P. Newhouse. Physician Fee Policy and Medicaid Program Costs. 1997.