| 来源类型 | Working Paper
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| 规范类型 | 报告
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| DOI | 10.3386/w3921
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| 来源ID | Working Paper 3921
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| Bank Runs: Liquidity and Incentives |
| Russell Cooper; Thomas W. Ross
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| 发表日期 | 1991-11-01
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| 出版年 | 1991
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | Diamond-Dybvig [1983] provide a model of intermediation in which bank runs are driven by pessimistic depositor expectations. Models which address these issues are important in the ongoing discussion which weighs the costs (incentive problems) and the benefits (preventing runs) of deposit insurance. In the present paper we extend the Diamond-Dybvig analysis to consider several important questions for evaluating deposit insurance that could not be addressed within their framework. First, we provide conditions for runs when banks can invest in both illiquid and liquid projects. This results in a weakening of the conditions necessary for bank runs relative to the Diamond-Dybvig model in which no liquid investments occur in equilibrium. Second, we characterize how banks respond to the possibility of runs in their design of deposit contracts and investment decisions, particularly through the holding of excess reserves. Finally, we use this framework to evaluate the costs and benefits of deposit insurance and other forms of intervention. To do so, we introduce moral hazard and monitoring into the model to explore the incentive effects of deposit insurance. The implementation of a capital requirement can, along with deposit insurance, support the optimal allocation. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics
; Money and Interest Rates
; Monetary Policy
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| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w3921
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/561255
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Russell Cooper,Thomas W. Ross. Bank Runs: Liquidity and Incentives. 1991.
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文件名：
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w3921.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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