| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w3265 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 3265 |
| Dynamic Optimal Income Taxation with Government Commitment | |
| Dagobert L. Brito; Jonathan H. Hamilton; Steven M. Slutsky; Joseph E. Stiglitz | |
| 发表日期 | 1990-02-01 |
| 出版年 | 1990 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The optimal income taxation problem has been extensively studied in one-period models. This paper analyzes optimal income taxation when consumers work for many periods. We also analyze what information, if any, that the government learns about abilities in one period can be used in later periods to attain more redistribution than in a one-period world. When the government must commit itself to future tax schedules, intertemporal nonstationarity of tax schedules could relax the self-selection constraints and lead to Pareto improvements. The effect of nonstationarity is analogous to that of randomization in one-period models. The use of information is limited since only a single lifetime self-selection constraint for each type of consumer exists. These results hold when individuals and the government have the same discount rates. The planner can make additional use of the information when individual and social rates of time discounting differ. In this case, the limiting tax schedule is a nondistorting one if the government has a lower discount rate than individuals. |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w3265 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/560551 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Dagobert L. Brito,Jonathan H. Hamilton,Steven M. Slutsky,et al. Dynamic Optimal Income Taxation with Government Commitment. 1990. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w3265.pdf（221KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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