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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w2706 |
来源ID | Working Paper 2706 |
Partisan Cycles in Congressional Elections and the Macroeconomy | |
Alberto Alesina; Howard Rosenthal | |
发表日期 | 1988-09-01 |
出版年 | 1988 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | The post-war United States exhibits two rather strong politico-economic regularities. The political regularity is that the party of the President has always lost votes in aid-term Congressional elections, relative to its Congressional vote in the previous elections; the economic regularity is that Republican administrations exhibit below average economic growth in the first half of each term and Democratic administrations are associated with above average growth in their first half. In the second halves economic growth is similar under the two administrations. We provide a rational expectations model which can explain these two regularities. In Presidential elections voters have to choose between two polarized candidates; mid-term elections are used to counterbalance the President's policies by strengthening the opposition in Congress. Since presidents of different parties are associated with different economic policies, our model predicts a (spurious) correlation between the state of the economy and elections. The predictions of our model are in sharp contrast with those of traditional retrospective voting models in which voters simply reward the incumbent if the economy is doing well immediately before the election. Our empirical results suggest that our model performs at least as well and often better than alternative models. In addition, we question previous claias that voters are short sighted and naively backward looking. |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w2706 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/559968 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alberto Alesina,Howard Rosenthal. Partisan Cycles in Congressional Elections and the Macroeconomy. 1988. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
w2706.pdf(458KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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