| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w0207 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 0207 |
| Local Government Budgeting: The Econometric Comparison of Political and Bureaucratic Models | |
| Martin Feldstein; Daniel J. Frisch | |
| 发表日期 | 1977-10-01 |
| 出版年 | 1977 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The current paper presents a method of deciding the question of whether any given stage in the budget process is an example of the "political" or the "bureaucratic" model. We then use it to study local government spending on education. The basis for our method is the important difference between the effect of intergovernmental aid that is implied by the political budget model and by the bureaucratic budget model. According to the bureaucratic model, the effect of inter-governmental aid on each category of educational input (e.g., teachers' salaries, books, etc.) depends only on the change in total educational spending induced by the aid and not on the type of aid that causes the change in spending. In contrast, the political budget model implies that the overall expenditure increase is the result of separate decisions on each of the expenditure categories and that the changes in these expenditure categories will depend on the form of the intergovernmental aid. Our method of exploiting this difference is presented in detail below. |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w0207 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/557395 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Martin Feldstein,Daniel J. Frisch. Local Government Budgeting: The Econometric Comparison of Political and Bureaucratic Models. 1977. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w0207.pdf（146KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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