| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP17478 |
| DP17478 Motivated Skepticism | |
| Jeanne Hagenbach | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-07-17 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We experimentally study how individuals read strategically-transmitted information when they have preferences over what they will learn. Subjects play disclosure games in which Receivers should interpret messages skeptically. We vary whether the state that Senders communicate about is ego-relevant or neutral for Receivers, and whether skeptical beliefs are aligned or not with what Receivers prefer believing. Skepticism is lower when skeptical beliefs are self-threatening than in neutral settings. When skeptical beliefs are self-serving, skepticism is not enhanced compared to neutral settings. These results demonstrate that individuals' exercise of skepticism depends on the conclusions of skeptical inferences. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Disclosure games Hard information Unraveling result Skepticism Motivated beliefs |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp17478 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/546572 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jeanne Hagenbach. DP17478 Motivated Skepticism. 2022. |
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