| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP17404 |
| DP17404 The Sale of Data: Learning Synergies Before M&As | |
| Patrick Legros | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-06-23 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Firms may share information to discover potential synergies between their data sets and algorithms, which eventually may lead to more efficient mergers and acquisitions (M&A) decisions. However, as pointed out by Arrow, information sharing also modifies the competitive balance when companies do not merge, and a firm may be reluctant to share information with potential rivals. Under general conditions, we show that firms benefit from (partially) sharing information. Because more sharing of information may increase industry expected profits both when there is head-to-head competition and when there is an M&A, the presence of a regulator who can prevent or allow the M&A can decrease or increase the level of information sharing, as well as consumer surplus, with respect to the no-regulator case. A regulator who can also control the level of information sharing will allow firms to share information. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Synergies Mergers Sale of data Incomplete information Antitrust Privacy |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp17404 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/546474 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Patrick Legros. DP17404 The Sale of Data: Learning Synergies Before M&As. 2022. |
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