| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP17363 |
| DP17363 Advising the management: A theory of shareholder engagement | |
| Ali Kakhbod; Uliana Loginova; Andrey Malenko; Nadya Malenko | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-06-06 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the effectiveness of shareholder engagement, i.e., shareholders communicating their views to management. When shareholders and management have different beliefs, each shareholder engages more effectively when more other shareholders engage as well. A limited shareholder base can thus prevent effective engagement. However, a limited shareholder base naturally arises under heterogeneous beliefs because investors who most disagree with management do not become shareholders. Passive funds, who own the firm regardless of their beliefs, can counteract these effects and improve engagement. When shareholders' and management's preferences are strongly misaligned, shareholders' engagement decisions become substitutes and the role of ownership structure declines. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Shareholder engagement Communication Advice Managerial learning Cheap talk Heterogeneous beliefs Ownership structure Passive funds Advisory voting |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp17363-2 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/546414 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Ali Kakhbod,Uliana Loginova,Andrey Malenko,et al. DP17363 Advising the management: A theory of shareholder engagement. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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