| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16051 |
| DP16051 A Commitment Theory of Populism | |
| Massimo Morelli; Antonio Nicolò; Paolo Roberti | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-05-19 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | When voters' trust in politicians collapses, they demand simple policies that they can easily monitor. Disenchanted citizens therefore prefer committed delegates to politicians who propose themselves as competent policy makers but without a specific policy commitment (trustees). In a two-party competition, the unique asymmetric equilibrium is such that voters with lower interest for the common good select a committed delegate, while those with higher interest for the common good appoint a trustee. In this equilibrium, we show that the committed delegate also chooses all the strategies typically associated with populism in the literature. Hence, this paper puts forward a commitment theory of populism. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Populism Competence Commitment Information acquisition Interest groups Morality |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16051-1 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/546346 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Massimo Morelli,Antonio Nicolò,Paolo Roberti. DP16051 A Commitment Theory of Populism. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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