| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP17276 |
| DP17276 The New Corporate Governance | |
| Oliver Hart; Luigi Zingales | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-05-04 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In the last few years, there has been a dramatic increase in shareholder engagement on environmental and social issues. In some cases shareholders are pushing companies to take actions that may reduce market value. It is hard to understand this behavior using the dominant corporate governance paradigm based on shareholder value maximization. We explain how jurisprudence has sustained this criterion in spite of its economic weaknesses. To overcome these weaknesses we propose the criterion of shareholder welfare maximization and argue that it can better explain observed behavior. Finally, we outline how shareholder welfare maximization can be implemented in practice. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Shareholder value Shareholder welfare Proxy voting |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp17276 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/546296 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Oliver Hart,Luigi Zingales. DP17276 The New Corporate Governance. 2022. |
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