| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP17264 |
| DP17264 Implicit Benefits and Financing | |
| Franklin Allen; Meijun Qian; Jing Xie | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-04-28 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Social relationship and business connections create implicit benefits between borrowers and lenders. We model how implicit benefits and repayment enforcement costs influence credit allocation, cost, and renegotiation. The optimal solution illustrates that financing with implicit benefits can in many circumstances achieve lower financing costs, higher managerial effort, and better economic outcomes for both the borrower and the lender. This result explains the continuing expansion of alternative financing despite advanced formal financial intermediation, the rise of corporate insider debt, and joint ownership of debt and equity. The growing size and complexity of projects and changes in community relationships explain the expansion of bank financing. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Implicit benefits Debt financing Banks Corporate insider debt Joint equity-debt ownership Social and business networks |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp17264 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/546278 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Franklin Allen,Meijun Qian,Jing Xie. DP17264 Implicit Benefits and Financing. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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