Gateway to Think Tanks
来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP17069 |
DP17069 How Organizational Capacity Can Improve Electoral Accountability | |
Dana Foarta | |
发表日期 | 2022-02-24 |
出版年 | 2022 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | The organizational structure of the bureaucracy is a key determinant of policy outcomes. Bureaucratic agencies exhibit wide variation in their organizational capacity, which allows politicians to strategically shape policy implementation. This paper examines what bureaucratic structure implies for the ability of voters to hold politi cians electorally accountable. It explicitly models differences in organizational capacity across bureaucratic agencies and considers a problem where a politician must decide not only which policy to choose but which agency, or combination of agencies, will implement it. The choice of implementation feeds back into the choice of policy and this, in turn, affects how voters perceive the performance of the incumbent. This creates a chain of interdependence from agency structure to policy choice and political accountability. The formal model shows that the variation in organizational capacity serves the interests of voters by improving electoral control of politicians. |
主题 | Political Economy |
关键词 | Organizational capacity Electoral accountability Bureaucratic politics |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp17069 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/546031 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Dana Foarta. DP17069 How Organizational Capacity Can Improve Electoral Accountability. 2022. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
个性服务 |
推荐该条目 |
保存到收藏夹 |
导出为Endnote文件 |
谷歌学术 |
谷歌学术中相似的文章 |
[Dana Foarta]的文章 |
百度学术 |
百度学术中相似的文章 |
[Dana Foarta]的文章 |
必应学术 |
必应学术中相似的文章 |
[Dana Foarta]的文章 |
相关权益政策 |
暂无数据 |
收藏/分享 |
除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。