| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP17019 |
| DP17019 Indirect Savings from Public Procurement Centralization | |
| Clarissa Lotti; Giancarlo Spagnolo | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-02-23 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | An influential study by Bandiera, Prat and Valletti (2009) exploits the introduction of a central purchasing agency in Italy to identify the amount and sources of public waste. Among other findings, it estimates that purchasing through a central agency directly saves 28% on prices. We find that centralized prices also have significant indirect effects, leading to a 17.7% reduction among non-centralized ones. The indirect effects of centralization appear driven by informational externalities -- rather than an improved outside option -- on less competent public buyers purchasing more complex goods. Accounting for indirect savings also increases the estimate of direct ones. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Centralization Informational externalities Procurement Public contracts |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp17019-0 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/546023 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Clarissa Lotti,Giancarlo Spagnolo. DP17019 Indirect Savings from Public Procurement Centralization. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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