| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16888 |
| DP16888 Self-Enforcing Contracts with Persistence | |
| Martin Dumav; William Fuchs; Jangwoo Lee | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-01-11 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We show theoretically that, in the presence of persistent productivity shocks, the reliance on selfenforcing contracts due to limited legal enforcement may provide a possible rationale why countries with the worse rule of law might exhibit: (i) higher aggregate TFP volatilities, (ii) larger dispersion of firm-level productivity, and (iii) greater wage inequality. We also provide suggestive empirical evidence consistent with the model’s aggregate implications. Finally, we relate the model’s firm-level implications to existing empirical findings. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Dynamic moral hazard Productivity Relational contracts Persistence Limited commitment |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16888 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545815 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Martin Dumav,William Fuchs,Jangwoo Lee. DP16888 Self-Enforcing Contracts with Persistence. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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