| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16872 |
| DP16872 Arrovian Efficiency and Auditability in Discrete Mechanism Design | |
| Marek Pycia; M. Utku Ünver | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-01-10 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study mechanism design and preference aggregation in environments in which the space of social alternatives is discrete and the preference domain is rich, as in standard models of social choice and so-called allocation without transfers. We show that a mechanism (or aggregation rule) selects the best outcome with respect to some resolute Arrovian social welfare function if, and only if, it is Pareto efficient and auditable. We further show that auditability implies non-bossiness and is implied by the conjunction of non-bossiness and individual strategy-proofness, and that the later conjunction is equivalent to group strategy-proofness as well as to Maskin monotonicity. As applications, we derive new characterizations in voting and allocation domains. |
| 主题 | Organizational Economics |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16872 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545800 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Marek Pycia,M. Utku Ünver. DP16872 Arrovian Efficiency and Auditability in Discrete Mechanism Design. 2022. |
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