| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16871 |
| DP16871 Simultaneous Search and Adverse Selection | |
| Sarah Auster; Piero Gottardi; Ronald Wolthoff | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-01-09 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the effect of diminishing search frictions in markets with adverse selection by presenting a model in which agents with private information can simultaneously contact multiple trading partners. We highlight a new trade-off: facilitating contacts reduces coordination frictions but also the ability to screen agents' types. We find that, when agents can contact sufficiently many trading partners, fully separating equilibria obtain only if adverse selection is sufficiently severe. When this condition fails, equilibria feature partial pooling and multiple equilibria co-exist. In the limit, as the number of contacts becomes large, some of the equilibria converge to the competitive outcomes of Akerlof (1970), including Pareto dominated ones; other pooling equilibria continue to feature frictional trade in the limit, where entry is inefficiently high. Our findings provide a basis to assess the effects of recent technological innovations which have made meetings easier. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Labour Economics ; Organizational Economics |
| 关键词 | Adverse selection Multiple applications Directed search |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16871 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545799 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Sarah Auster,Piero Gottardi,Ronald Wolthoff. DP16871 Simultaneous Search and Adverse Selection. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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