| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16790 |
| DP16790 Information hierachies | |
| Benjamin A Brooks; Alexander Frankel; Emir Kamenica | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-12-07 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | If experiment A is Blackwell more informative than experiment B, it is always possible that A and B are induced by signals A' and B' such that A' is a refinement of B', that is, A' entails observing B' plus some additional information. We first show that this result does not extend beyond pairs of experiments: There exist collections of experiments that cannot be induced by a collection of signals so that whenever two experiments are Blackwell ordered, the associated signals are refinement ordered. In other words, sometimes it is impossible for more informed agents to know everything that less informed agents know. More broadly, define an information hierarchy to be a partially ordered set that ranks experiments in terms of informativeness. Is it the case that for any choice of experiments indexed on the hierarchy such that higher experiments are Blackwell more informative, there are signals that induce these experiments with higher signals being refinements of lower signals? We show that the answers is affirmative if and only if the undirected graph of the information hierarchy is a forest. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Information beliefs Signals Blackwell order Networks |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16790 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545722 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Benjamin A Brooks,Alexander Frankel,Emir Kamenica. DP16790 Information hierachies. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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