G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP16724
DP16724 Search Direction: Position Externalities and Position Auction Bias
Simon Anderson; Regis Renault
发表日期2021-11-15
出版年2021
语种英语
摘要We formulate a tractable model of pricing under directed search with heterogeneous firm demands. Demand height and width drive bids in a position auction and enable us to bridge insights from the ordered search literature to those in the position auction literature. Equilibrium pricing implies that the marginal consumer’s surplus decreases down the search order, so consumers optimally follow the firms’ position ordering. A firm suffers from ”business stealing” by firms that precede it and ”search appeal” from subsequent firms. We find rankings that achieve the maximal joint profit, social welfare, or consumer surplus by constructing firm-specific scores. A generalized second price auction for positions endogenizes equilibrium orders and bids are driven by position externalities that impact incremental profit from switching positions. The joint profit maximization order is upheld when firm heterogeneity concerns mostly demand height. But the consumer welfare order is robust when firms differ mostly over demand width.
主题Industrial Organization ; Organizational Economics
关键词Ordered search Product heterogeneity Position externalities Optimal and equilibrium rankings Generalized second price auction Position auction
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp16724
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545660
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Simon Anderson,Regis Renault. DP16724 Search Direction: Position Externalities and Position Auction Bias. 2021.
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