| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16715 |
| DP16715 On the Interaction between Patent Screening and its Enforcement | |
| Gerard Llobet; Álvaro Parra; Javier Suarez | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-11-12 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper explores the interplay between patent screening and patent enforcement. Costly enforcement involves type I and type II errors. When the patent office takes the rates at which such errors occur as given, granting some invalid patents is socially optimal even in the absence of screening costs because it encourages innovation. When the influence on courts’ enforcement effort is considered, these same forces imply that screening and enforcement are complementary. This means that, contrary to common wisdom, better screening induces better enforcement but also that an increase in enforcement costs could be optimally accommodated with less rather than more ex-ante screening. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Intellectual property Innovation Imitation Patent screening Patent enforcement Industry dynamics |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16715 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545652 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Gerard Llobet,Álvaro Parra,Javier Suarez. DP16715 On the Interaction between Patent Screening and its Enforcement. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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