| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16581 |
| DP16581 Learning in Bank Runs | |
| Eva Schliephake; Joel Shapiro | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-09-26 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We examine a model in which depositor learning exacerbates bank runs. Informed depositors can quickly withdraw when the bank has low-quality assets. Uninformed depositors may decide to wait, which allows them to learn by observing informed depositors' actions. However, learning that the bank has low-quality assets will spark a run ex-post, which increases the incentives of uninformed depositors to run ex-ante. Moreover, when there are more informed depositors, uninformed depositors have a fear of missing out, which also makes preemptive runs more likely. Learning may, thus, increase the likelihood of panic runs and decrease surplus. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Information-based bank runs |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16581 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545530 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Eva Schliephake,Joel Shapiro. DP16581 Learning in Bank Runs. 2021. |
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