| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP16562
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| DP16562 Complexity and the Reform Process |
| Massimo Morelli; Dana Foarta
|
| 发表日期 | 2021-09-16
|
| 出版年 | 2021
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | Reform processes commonly involve professional bureaucrats drafting policies to be adopted by political decision makers. Conflicts of interest between these two groups may give rise to pandering in policymaking. We expand the standard pandering setup in two directions. First, we allow for policies to differ in their complexity. Second, we model the dynamic consequences of reforms, where a complex (simple) policy complexifies (simplifies) the legislative environment in which subsequent policies are drafted. We show that pandering motivates inefficient complex policies, which beget complexity in the legislative environment. We derive conditions under which the complexity build-up is bounded. Stabilization around an intermediate level of complexity is achieved under high uncertainty around the type of policy reform suited to current conditions and around the bureaucracy's capacity to implement it. When complex reforms are expected to be the right ones but bureaucratic capacity is uncertain, the legislative environment may enter a trap of ever increasing complexity. |
| 主题 | Public Economics
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16562
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| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545513
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Massimo Morelli,Dana Foarta. DP16562 Complexity and the Reform Process. 2021.
|
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