| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16507 |
| DP16507 Selling Impressions: Efficiency vs. Competition | |
| Stephen Morris; Dirk Bergemann; Tibor Heumann; Constantine Sorokin; Eyal Winter | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-09-02 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In digital advertising, a publisher selling impressions faces a trade-off in deciding how precisely to match advertisers with viewers. A more precise match generates efficiency gains that the publisher can hope to exploit. A coarser match will generate a thicker market and thus more competition. The publisher can control the precision of the match by controlling the amount of information that advertisers have about viewers. We characterize the optimal trade-off when impressions are sold by auction. The publisher pools premium matches for advertisers (when there will be less competition on average) but gives advertisers full information about lower quality matches. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Second price auction Conflation Targeted advertising Impressions Two-sided private information Bayesian persuasion Information design |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16507 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545462 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Stephen Morris,Dirk Bergemann,Tibor Heumann,et al. DP16507 Selling Impressions: Efficiency vs. Competition. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
