| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16412 |
| DP16412 Who Saves More, the Naive or the Sophisticated Agent? | |
| Max Groneck; Alexander Ludwig; Alexander Zimper | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-07-31 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We consider an additively time-separable life-cycle model for the family of power period utility functions u such that u'(c) = c^(-theta) for resistance to inter-temporal substitution of theta > 0. The utility maximization problem over life-time consumption is dynamically inconsistent for almost all specifications of effective discount factors. Pollak (1968) shows that the savings behavior of a sophisticated agent and her naive counterpart is always identical for a logarithmic utility function (i.e., for theta = 1). As an extension of Pollak's result we show that the sophisticated agent saves a greater (smaller) fraction of her wealth in every period than her naive counterpart whenever theta > 1 (theta < 1) irrespective of the specification of discount factors. We further show that this finding extends to an environment with risky returns and dynamically inconsistent Epstein-Zin-Weil preferences. |
| 主题 | Monetary Economics and Fluctuations |
| 关键词 | Life-cycle model Discount functions Dynamic inconsistency Savings behavior Naive agent Sophisticated agent Choquet expected utility preferences Epstein-weil-zin preferences |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16412 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545374 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Max Groneck,Alexander Ludwig,Alexander Zimper. DP16412 Who Saves More, the Naive or the Sophisticated Agent?. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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